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PAMELA L. CAUGHIE teaches 
twentieth-century literature and 
theory at Loyola University, Chi- 
cago. She is author of Virginia 
Woolf and Postmodernism (U of 
Illinois P 1991) and is complet- 
ing the manuscript of a book, 
Passing and Pedagogy: The Dy- 
namics of Responsibility (U of 
Illinois P), which includes a ver- 
sion of this essay. Another ver- 
sion of the essay will appear in 
In Other Words: Feminism and 
Composition Studies, edited by 
Susan C. Jarratt and Lynn Wor- 
sham (MLA, forthcoming). 
Unlike the stereotypical feminist model that suggests women best come to voice 
in an atmosphere of safety .. ., I encourage students to work ... in an atmo- 
sphere where they may be afraid or see themselves at risk. 
bell hooks, Talking Back 
HIS ESSAY attempts to intervene theoretically and pragmati- 
cally at a critical moment in our profession, when literary stud- 
ies in colleges and universities across the United States is increasingly 
becoming culture studies.' This transformation over the past two decades 
in the social, philosophical, and political bases of the humanities is due 
partly to the academy's efforts to acknowledge diversity, by institution- 
alizing multiculturalism and various "studies programs" (women's stud- 
ies, gay studies, ethnic studies, composition studies) in response to the 
influx of nontraditional students since the early 1970s, and partly to 
poststructuralism's efforts to theorize difference and to destabilize the 
very categories of identity on which those studies programs are founded. 
Such programs, particularly women's studies, have traditionally been 
devoted to a humanist concept of the subject as "source and agent of 
conscious action or meaning" (P. Smith xxxiii-xxxiv) and committed to 
opening this subject position to previously marginalized groups. In con- 
trast, poststructuralist theories, including some feminist theories, have 
revealed the humanist subject to be a sham insofar as it is the effect, not 
the origin, of representation. As this essay suggests, when antifounda- 
tional theories that deconstruct the self converge with studies programs 
that revive it, anxiety arises over the positions we find ourselves in as 
scholars and teachers in the newly configured university.2 
Culture studies would seem to offer a pedagogy for working through 
the tensions between these two perspectives on the subject since issues 
of identity formation and of subject position are central not only to its 
object of study but to its method of inquiry. Culture studies has shifted 
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the focus of literary studies from interpreting, trans- 
mitting, or preserving individual texts considered 
representative of particular cultures to analyzing 
culture as a historically specific ensemble of social 
practices and signifying systems that provide, in 
Mary Poovey's words, "the terms through which 
humans understand our world [and] from which we 
derive our identity" ("Criticism" 618). Given that 
the reading, writing, and teaching we do as academ- 
ics partially constitute the cultural formations it 
seeks to interrogate, culture studies necessarily 
takes the work of teachers and scholars as one of its 
objects of scrutiny. Concerned with "the complex 
ways in which identity itself is articulated, experi- 
enced, and deployed" (Nelson, Treichler, and Gross- 
berg 9) and with the "politics of location" (Faigley 
218), culture studies requires its practitioners "to in- 
clude in their critical view the conditions of their 
own existence" at the same time that it identifies 
itself "polemically with certain social constituen- 
cies"-for instance, blacks, women, workers (Bath- 
rick 323-25). The classroom becomes a site of both 
cultural intervention and continual self-critique. To 
practice culture studies, as Susan Rubin Suleiman 
writes in another context, "is to implicate yourself, 
your self, in what you write" (2) and what you teach. 
Yet however strong, however sincere, our com- 
mitment as literature professors to certain social 
constituencies and to continual self-critique, when 
ethnicity becomes "the new frontier, accessible to 
all" (hooks, Yearning 52), when men become femi- 
nists and straights become queer, when African 
American studies and women's studies become cul- 
tural studies, when a prominent feminist can write, 
"I began to wonder whether there was any position 
from which a white middle-class feminist could say 
anything on the subject [of race] without sounding 
exactly like [a white middle-class feminist].... In 
which case it might be better not to say anything" 
(Miller, "Criticizing" 364)-something, it seems, 
has gone wrong. The practitioners of culture stud- 
ies experience a double bind in which the desire- 
indeed, the imperative-to speak as or for members 
of a particular social group conflicts with the anxi- 
eties such a practice evokes. The writer who deliber- 
ately assumes another's position risks being accused 
of unconsciously doing so.3 
In recent writings, I have deployed the term pass- 
ing to describe our subject positions in postmodern 
culture and by extension in a culture studies para- 
digm.4 Passing traditionally refers to the practice of 
representing oneself-for social, economic, or po- 
litical reasons-as a member of a particular group 
not considered one's own. Historically, the practice 
is mainly, though not exclusively, associated with 
the assumption of a white identity by light-skinned 
African Americans. Passing is generally implicated 
in a racist social organization. The painful psychic 
consequences of passing attested to in many narra- 
tives are corporeally depicted in Agnieszka Hol- 
land's 1991 film Europa, Europa, based on Solomon 
Perel's autobiography, in which the protagonist, a 
German Jew, tries to conceal his identity from his 
Nazi companions by pulling what remains of his 
foreskin over the tip of his penis and tying it in place 
with a piece of thread. 
In its traditional sense, passing often carries pe- 
jorative connotations of deception, dishonesty, and 
betrayal.5 When used as a metaphor, with the opera- 
tive as, the term can apply to situations in which one 
engages in impersonation for the purpose of fraud. 
But in my use, passing (without the as) figures the 
always slippery difference between standing for 
something (having a firm position) and passing 
as something (having no position or a fraudulent 
one), between the strategic adoption of a politi- 
cally empowered identity (e.g., when blacks pass as 
white) and the disempowering appropriation of a 
potentially threatening difference (e.g., when men 
pass as feminist), and between what one professes 
as a teacher (the positions one assumes in the class- 
room, often speaking for another) and how one is 
positioned in a society, an institution, a discourse, 
or a classroom. Marking a discrepancy between 
what one professes to be (and what one professes, 
as a writer or teacher) and how one is positioned, 
passing is risky business-but, as this essay pro- 
fesses, unavoidable. For there is no occupying a 
position without passing. Thus I offer passing not 
as a solution to the double bind I outlined above 
but as a descriptive theory of its dynamics. 
Unlike the more common notions of speaking as 
and speaking for, passing disrupts subject posi- 
tions. The difference between these two ways of 
conceptualizing the problem is highlighted by two 
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sentences that appear on the same page of Linda 
Alcoff's "The Problem of Speaking for Others," 
which analyzes many of the issues and impasses I 
confront in this essay. For Alcoff, the problem of 
speaking for arises from the recognition that the 
"positionality" of the speaker "bears on" the mean- 
ing and truth of what the speaker says (an insight 
that women's studies and African American studies 
programs were founded on) and that some privi- 
leged locations are "discursively dangerous" no 
matter what the speaker's intentions (6-7).6 Realiz- 
ing the dangers but opposing a retreat from the 
practice of speaking for, Alcoff offers imperatives 
for ensuring that speakers' representations of oth- 
ers are responsible. The primary injunction is that 
speakers must interrogate the effects of their social 
locations on what they say (24-26). 
Alcoff's insistence on self-critique combines a 
materialist focus on specific locations with a post- 
modernist understanding of the discursive charac- 
ter of subjectivity. The "mediated character of all 
representations" (9) is acknowledged in the two 
sentences I want to compare: 
When I speak for myself, I am constructing a possible 
self, a way to be in the world, and am offering that to 
others, whether I intend to or not, as one possible way 
to be. 
When I "speak for myself" I am participating in the 
creation and reproduction of discourses through which 
my own and other selves are constituted. (21) 
Alcoff seems to be saying much the same thing 
in these two sentences, yet the quotation marks 
around "speak for myself" in the second make the 
(dia)critical difference. In the first sentence, the I 
takes for granted that it can speak for itself, that it 
can occupy a subject position, that there even are 
subject positions one can occupy, however self- 
consciously. In the second sentence, the I is perfor- 
mative, constituted in and through speaking, the act 
of invoking an I. The second sentence reveals the 
I of the first and the subject of Alcoff's imperatives 
to be a seduction of grammar (Butler, Bodies 6). 
The one who writes the first sentence forgets the I 
of the second, writing as if one could be immune to 
the effects of performance.7 
The impasse between Alcoff's two sentences 
gives rise to the structural dynamics that I term 
passing. The slippage between the volitional and 
the performative subject makes passing inevitable 
whenever any I claims to speak for itself.8 Even if 
as teachers and critics of culture studies we ac- 
knowledge our social locations as multiple and un- 
stable, shaped by specific histories and subject to 
various representational technologies, we always 
talk of subject positions and self-critique as if we 
were immune to performance and thereby resusci- 
tate in practice (in grammar) the subject we disman- 
tle in theory. In this sense, as Mas'ud Zavarzadeh 
and Donald Morton argue (15-16), the practice of 
writing itself may resist the radical insights of post- 
modern theories, putting us all in the position of 
passing when we speak for ourselves and others. 
Passing is neither something one does (as in per- 
forming a role) nor something one is (a subject po- 
sition we must account for) but a way of naming 
and conceptualizing an interpersonal, psychopoliti- 
cal dynamics that for many of us structures the ex- 
perience of reading, teaching, and writing about 
literature today.9 Passing is not always and only a 
volitional act that an already positioned subject 
chooses to engage in. Passing happens, and it hap- 
pens despite, or more often because of, our sincere 
efforts to get it right.'? 
In this essay, I engage performatively with cul- 
tural and pedagogical debates over the nature of the 
subject by working through the dynamics of passing 
exemplified in a particular exchange on this issue 
among feminists, in two student responses to the 
1934 film Imitation of Life, and in Fannie Hurst's 
novel that inspired the film. My purpose is not only 
to argue for a performative concept of the I but also, 
and more important, to show that taking a certain 
position on the subject-whether as feminists, cul- 
tural critics, or literature teachers-is not the same 
as accepting responsibility for the subject positions 
we assume and put into play in the classroom. 
The Subject in Feminism 
The question of women as the subject of feminism raises 
the possibility that there may not be a subject who stands 
"before" the lavw awaiting representation in or by the law. 
Judith Butler, Gender Trouble 
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Two prominent debates among feminists in the 
1990s have centered on the viability of postmoder 
theories for feminist politics and on the political 
implications of the use white feminists make, in 
their writing and teaching, of black women's texts. 
These debates are not unrelated, since black and 
white feminists alike have accused some white fem- 
inists of exploiting the "fractured public identi- 
ties" (Berlant 121) of African American women to 
promote a new postmodern subjectivity. Whereas 
twenty years ago white feminists were accused 
(fairly) of ignoring black women's writings and ex- 
periences in their theories, today they are accused 
of turning to black women's writings and bodies to 
rereferentialize or rematerialize an increasingly ab- 
stract and disengaged theoretical feminism. Twenty 
years ago, before the institution of culture studies 
in the United States academy, one of two mutually 
exclusive responses to these charges of neglect pre- 
vailed: to add the particular oppressions faced by 
black women to a universal and liberationist theory 
of gender oppression or to admit, as Patricia Meyer 
Spacks did in The Female Imagination, that a white 
middle-class woman could not theorize about ex- 
periences she had not had (see Carby, ch. 1). In 
contrast, contemporary cultural critics, who prob- 
lematize the very boundaries of social identities on 
which such responses rested, are more likely to at- 
tend to "the operations of race in the feminine" 
(Abel 471). Today we hear less about the failure of 
the (white) female imagination to project itself into 
unfamiliar experiences than about the exposure of 
white (female) desires in that very effort-to speak 
as or for black women. 
Two recent articles by white feminist critics dem- 
onstrate not only the requirement of culture studies 
that we speak on behalf of certain social constitu- 
encies while engaging in self-critique but also the 
double bind created by this imperative. Margaret 
Homans in "'Women of Color' Writers and Femi- 
nist Theory" and Elizabeth Abel in "Black Writing, 
White Reading: Race and the Politics of Feminist 
Interpretation" critique white feminists' use of black 
women's texts and are, to differing degrees, self- 
conscious, indeed nervous, about the double bind 
of their own positions as white feminist critics writ- 
ing on black women's texts. Together these essays 
provide a pretext for analyzing the dynamics of 
passing in cultural criticism and critical pedagogy." 
Homans criticizes certain feminists (Diana Fuss, 
Donna Haraway, and Judith Butler) for appropriat- 
ing texts by "women of color" (Homans's term) to 
figure a postmodern theory of subjectivity that cri- 
tiques "bodily or biological based theories of gen- 
der" and identity (82). Citing only the "postmodern" 
aspects of the texts they appropriate, these theorists, 
Homans charges, downplay the texts' ambivalence. 
They ignore that the works in fact position them- 
selves on both sides of the identity debate, invoking 
a natural or already existing identity and revealing 
an awareness that such an identity is always "in the 
process of being made" (79). Homans revalues these 
texts' naturalizing tendencies, the ways in which 
"women of color" reclaim themselves as embodied 
subjects. The texts promote a concept of identity as 
embodiment: they construct the black female body 
as natural (86). To use these texts as examples 
of postmodern theories of the subject, which for 
Homans are theories of disembodiment, is to deny 
the texts' claim to the natural while reembodying 
theories of dis-embodiment, making "women of 
color" do the cultural work they have always done- 
namely, embodying the body for white culture (73). 
As an example, Homans contrasts treatments 
of Sojourner Truth by Donna Haraway and Alice 
Walker. Haraway urges us to be like Sojourner Truth, 
who becomes in her essay a figure for a "nongeneric, 
nonoriginal humanity" (qtd. in Homans 78). For 
Haraway, Homans says, the body of the black 
woman is a "resource for metaphor" (77). Walker, 
in contrast, achieves a "personal identification" 
with Sojourner Truth, claiming to be her. Whereas 
Haraway's figurative language is "an alibi for de- 
materializing the [black] female body" (78), Walk- 
er's identification is a way of (re)claiming that body. 
In Homan's reading, Walker and Truth stand before 
the law (of representation), bearing an unmediated 
relation to the black female body-embodying it 
naturally, as if their identity were so close to nature 
that it did not pass through the filter of cultural dis- 
courses, those "powerful institutionalized rhetorics 
that provide the terms in which to represent the self 
as a subject in relation to others" (Brodkey, "Peda- 
gogy" 138). Yet the ambivalence Homans notices 
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in black women's writings would also suggest these 
writers' recognition of the filter. 
Abel's critique of Barbara Johnson follows the 
same lines as Homans's reading of Haraway and 
Butler. Johnson ignores in Zora Neale Hurston's 
writings "a possible belief in, or desire for belief 
in, a black identity," Abel argues, because Johnson 
understands race as rhetorical rather than literal 
(480). For Johnson, representations of a black es- 
sence operate within "specific interlocutionary sit- 
uation[s]" and are "matters of strategy rather than 
truth" (qtd. in Abel 480). By dereferentializing 
race, Abel says, Johnson displaces "a discourse on 
race" with "a discourse on positionality," a move 
that enables the white deconstructionist to write as 
the black novelist. By as, Abel means not only "in 
the manner of" (for she has just compared John- 
son's and Hurston's techniques of framing their es- 
says) but also "in the subject position of." For if 
race is simply a matter of figuration, a white critic 
can assume the position of a black writer. Drawing 
on Johnson's critique of male philosophers who 
position themselves as women, Abel points out that 
Johnson, while capable of positioning herself phil- 
osophically as a black woman, cannot be positioned 
politically as black. Failing to make this distinc- 
tion, Johnson risks "dislocating race from histori- 
cally accreted differences in power" (482-83). 
Homans and Abel demonstrate effectively that 
adopting a certain theoretical position on the sub- 
ject (in this case, a reputedly postmodernist posi- 
tion) is not the same as taking responsibility for 
one's own subject position as enacted in one's writ- 
ing, and to this extent they advance one argument I 
am making about passing. And both reveal, to recall 
Abel's phrase, "the operations of race in the femi- 
nine." But what interests me are the solutions Ho- 
mans and Abel present to the problem of writing 
across racial differences, the ways in which they 
try to save themselves, as well as (white) feminist 
criticism, from exposing themselves-that is, from 
passing in the pejorative sense. 
According to Homans, the "cultural problematic" 
in white feminist writings on black women's texts 
is both "a problem of race relations in the academy" 
and part of "the widespread debate over the uses of 
postmodernist heory for feminist political practice" 
(76). The troubling question, as Homans acknowl- 
edges, is whether this cultural problematic autho- 
rizes or invalidates (or both) her position in her 
essay. While Homans never explicitly returns to this 
question, she implies an answer. She comes close 
to suggesting (as does Nancy Miller in the remark 
cited above) that white feminists should have noth- 
ing to do with-or at least do nothing with-the 
writing of "women of color." Ironically, since she 
uses such writing, this argument would put Homans 
in the position of passing as black. But the differ- 
ence between Homans and the feminists she attacks 
lies not in the fact that they use black women's 
writings to defend their positions on the subject but 
in the positions they take. As Abel points out, for 
Homans all women share the cultural condition of 
embodiment, which is devalued because the sym- 
bolic register (figuration) depends on the exclusion 
of "the female (maternal) body" (literalness) (484). 
Thus, it is precisely the construction of the black 
female body as natural that not only makes Alice 
Walker's claim to (be) Truth tenable but also en- 
ables Homans to represent a theory of embodied 
subjectivity through Walker while at the same time 
saving herself from her own criticism of white fem- 
inists who use black women to embody their theo- 
ries. Homans exonerates herself from her racially 
charged accusations against others by claiming to 
use black women's figures of embodiment instead 
of making the women figures for her position on 
embodiment (which happens to coincide with theirs). 
Yet Homans's effort to reclaim or reliteralize the 
black woman's body, as she questions "the political 
utility of arguments that dissociate feminism from 
the body" (87), does not save her from charges of 
appropriation but implicates her in an instance of 
passing far more audacious than the examples she 
cites. Characterizing postmodern feminists as the 
exploitative white mistress whose work is done by 
black women, Homans casts herself in the role of 
the domestic. As she puts it, black women in her 
essay "are working . . . for themselves at least as 
much as for me. Perhaps it could even be said that I 
am working for them" (88). The rhetoric of domes- 
tic service serves Homans's interests in the same 
way she claims black women's historically consti- 
tuted identities serve postmodern feminists' inter- 
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ests. The rhetorical gesture allows her to pass not 
only as the domestic (working for others) but also as 
a black woman, speaking as and for black women 
in the pages of New Literary History and in this 
feminist debate over the subject. In the name of re- 
claiming embodiment, Homans embodies another's 
position and then uses that figurative position to at- 
tack a theory of figuration. The rhetoric of her as- 
sertion is incompatible with its explicit meaning, 
and her performance (her assumption of an identity) 
comes into conflict with the identity she would as- 
sume (take for granted). 
I do not mean to deny the value of Homans's es- 
say, especially in its attention to the writings of 
black feminist theorists. Rather, my point is that 
there is in the essay an incompatibility between her 
rhetoric and her meaning, her performance and her 
theory. This is, I argue, a function of the dynamics 
that I have identified as inherent in the cultural 
problematic that Homans sees as the problem to be 
resolved. Failing to interrogate how this problematic 
inflects her writing (the ways in which she may be 
passing), Homans displaces the general fear that the 
essence of feminism (not just a shared concept of 
woman but also the idea that women share the same 
positions) is at risk in postmodernity with the more 
specific anxiety that "women of color" are being 
denied the opportunity to represent themselves be- 
cause white feminists have unfair access to the means 
of representing theory in the academy and unfair 
access to "race" as, in hooks's words, "the new fron- 
tier."'2 I do not refute this specific claim, but I 
question the effort to get out of this structure by re- 
claiming the body in the name of "women of color." 
In calling for "thick descriptions" as a more vi- 
able feminist practice (496) and in engaging the 
writings of feminists of different theoretical persua- 
sions, Abel at least potentially directs her attention 
to feminist criticism as an institution rather than to 
a particular kind of feminism. Analyzing the work 
of Homans, Johnson, and Susan Willis, Abel argues 
that no matter what theoretical position they take, 
their readings across racial lines are marked by 
white desires. Comparing Johnson and Homans, 
Abel writes that whereas "privileging the figurative 
enables the white reader [Johnson] to achieve figu- 
rative blackness" (to speak as), "privileging the lit- 
eral enables the white woman reader [Homans] to 
forge a gender alliance" across race (to speak for) 
(485). Black and white writers meet in shared figu- 
rality for Johnson; black and white women meet in 
shared literality for Homans. Both feminists, Abel 
continues, use black women to legitimate their own 
positions, and for both, race is "a salient source of 
fantasies and allegiances that shape" white women's 
reading of black women's writing (486, 497). All 
these efforts to read across racial lines are for Abel 
forms of passing, and in the end, all passing fails 
because "our inability to avoid inscribing racially 
inflected investments and agendas limits white fem- 
inism's capacity either to impersonate black femi- 
nism, and potentially render it expendable, or to 
counter its specific credibility" (497). Instead of 
deflecting these racial investments onto particular 
feminists, Abel calls for a particular practice among 
white feminists reading black women's writing: to 
provide "thick descriptions" of black women's texts 
and to engage in continual self-critique. 
In the opening of her essay, Abel practices self- 
critique, embarrassingly exposing her own "racially 
specific investments" in her reading of Toni Morri- 
son's story "Recitatif." For Abel, self-critique de- 
pends on confession, and the confessional I is the 
guilty I. This I-whether Abel's or Nancy Miller's 
or Descartes's-responds to the anxiety of finding 
that the I is not what it thinks (i.e., that it is a fraud) 
by trying to master the self, hailing us right back to 
the Enlightenment notion of the subject before the 
law. The belief that we can and must rid ourselves 
of unruly desires before we can write responsibly 
about others is not unlike the desire for an un- 
marked position that characterizes Enlightenment 
discourses. Both presuppose the self-determining, 
rational subject of humanism. Abel's call for an al- 
ternative practice for feminist criticism assumes 
that honest individuals, who are coherent, compre- 
hending subjects, can give an honest account of 
themselves (see Poovey, "Feminism" 37, 42). For 
Abel, as for Homans and Miller, the subject in fem- 
inism is already there, constituted by her (white) 
desires and exposing herself at every turn. 
In Abel's and Homans's analyses, passing is 
a charge to level against others, an illegitimate 
subject position, or a practice to be consciously 
avoided through persistent self-critique. Isolating 
the categories of race and gender from other social 
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determinants, as both women tend to do, does not 
invalidate the insights provided by their analyses, 
but it does mean that neither critic is capable of 
analyzing the way in which passing originates in 
the cultural problematic that Homans identifies as 
a problem of race relations in the academy and as a 
consequence of postmodern theory and culture. Suf- 
fering guilt over prior exclusionary practices and 
anxiety about the precariousness of identity in post- 
modern culture, some white feminists seek comfort 
in confessions that aim to reclaim the subject in the 
name of those who in part have brought about the 
crisis of identity in feminism and in the general 
culture. Indeed, practicing self-critique as confes- 
sional seems to intensify white writers' tendency to 
use blacks "as a way of talking about and policing 
matters of repression and meditations on ethics 
and accountability" (Morrison 7). For this reason, 
Abel, who connects her critical project with Morri- 
son's in Playing in the Dark, cannot avoid partici- 
pating in the very practice she seeks to expose. Nor 
can I or anyone else who is similarly positioned in 
the academy. 
Failing to account for the postmodern context 
of her own analyses, Abel misses the point of her 
call for thick descriptions of "a cultural economy 
which constructs the feminine in the domain of 
racial difference" (Wiegman 323). If white femi- 
nists, in Robyn Wiegman's words, tend "to circu- 
late 'racial difference' as a commodity in our own 
discourses, pasting over the white bourgeois woman 
who occupies the center of our theoretical par- 
adigms with images of black women whose his- 
torical and material specificity we thereby render 
indecipherable" (as Abel and Homans argue), then 
"the future of feminism depends on revealing the 
inadequacies of its most privileged theoretical cate- 
gory"-women (326). This is the task of postmod- 
ern feminism, if postmodernism is understood as a 
historical and cultural imperative and not merely 
as a theory of identity. 
I have discussed this debate over the subject in 
feminism at some length for two reasons. First, at 
least insofar as it gives rise to efforts to expose the 
passer and to a form of self-critique that entails po- 
licing identities, this debate can have the effect of 
making students unwilling to risk themselves in 
their writing (or, in Suleiman's terms, to risk being 
contemporary), thereby rendering them incapable 
of analyzing the import of postmodernism for the 
multiple subject positions that any person can in- 
habit and that make up the body politic (see Wicke 
30; Harper, Framing 90-91). This debate can make 
students feel they must get it right, say the right 
things, make the right moves, and avoid revealing 
too much of themselves. Yet, contradictorily, what 
women's studies, African American studies, and 
composition studies-as responses to the influx of 
nontraditional students into the academy-have his- 
torically sought to do is to allow more exposure of 
the self in writing. As forms of critical pedagogy, 
feminism and culture studies must resist efforts to 
reclaim "a sovereign, self-aware consciousness at 
the center of the composing act," in practice as 
much as in theory, by shifting attention from the 
individual writer to the scene of writing-to the 
possibilities and constraints of the rhetorical and 
cultural situation in which we find ourselves (see 
Crowley 32-34, 46). For, and this is my second 
point, as a politics of positioning (not a new theory 
of identity but a response to the problem of identity 
in postmodern culture), passing is an effect of the 
institutional and cultural realities in which we teach 
and write. As Amy Robinson argues, "In an aca- 
demic milieu in which identity and identity politics 
remain at the forefront of a battle over legitimate 
critical and/or political acts, the social practice of 
passing offers a productive framework through 
which to reimagine the contours of this debate" 
(716). If culture studies is about nothing else, it is 
about revealing the ways in which what appears nat- 
ural, given, is historically and culturally produced. 
In structuring our writing and reading assignments, 
we need to seize the opportunities for passing that 
the emergence of culture studies in the academy 
has created. Culture studies makes passing unavoid- 
able, perhaps inevitable. 
Class Notes: An Interlude 
Women have rarely been composers. But we do have one 
advantage. We're used to performiing. 
Laurie Anderson (qtd. in McClary) 
In a writing-intensive core course on the Harlem 
Renaissance, I showed the 1934 film Initation of 
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Life, a melodrama based on a popular novel by Fan- 
nie Hurst and remade in 1959, and asked the stu- 
dents to respond in their journals to the relationship 
between the two mothers in the film, Bea Pullman 
and her live-in domestic, Delilah. One woman, who 
asked me not to share her response with the class, 
clearly expressed the anxieties that arise when a hu- 
manist concept of the subject comes into conflict 
with a critical pedagogy: 
I am not even really sure if this is supposed to be an 
important part of the movie but it got me thinking. It's 
the "friendship" between Aunt D. and Miss B. The rea- 
son I am a bit confused is because I am not sure I am 
supposed to take it at face value. Here is the way I saw 
the friendship: I believe it was an honest to goodness 
one. For example, when Aunt D. was worried since her 
daughter didn't come home after she received a letter 
stating her daughter left school, Miss B. wanted to go 
with Aunt D. to help her find her. I saw Miss B. as 
someone who cared a great deal for Aunt D. Miss B. 
also let Peola know how disappointed she was in her 
by the way she was treating her mother. 
The confusion lies here. Being that this is a class 
on African Americans, I am not sure if I am not look- 
ing, or should be looking for hidden reasons (as far as 
color goes). Because Aunt D. did not move out and buy 
her own house after she came into some money, am I 
to think this had anything to do with color? See, I be- 
lieve it does not. I myself am someone who enjoys 
taking care of others. It has always been a part of my 
nature. Did Aunt D. stay because this too was a part 
of her nature or because since she was black she felt 
she would not be in her "place" if she did not stay and 
take care of Miss B. and her daughter? Perhaps this 
was not a color issue. Just wondering. 
The confusion, the hesitancy, the quotation marks 
as qualifiers suggest that the student has learned 
that "an honest to goodness" response is not to be 
trusted, that what comes naturally to her may impli- 
cate her in racist language, if not racist social prac- 
tices. But the language also reveals a strong desire to 
believe in her natural self, to assure herself that her 
desires belong to her and are "not a color issue." 
In contrast, another woman, who was more than 
willing to share her response, shows that she has 
clearly learned the lesson of cultural criticism: 
The characteristics given to Delilah were many of 
the same characteristics attributed to the mammy ste- 
reotype. All of her tendencies were described as being 
"natural." For example, Delilah said that it was "natu- 
ral" for her to raise children. This idea goes back to the 
notion that mammies have an overwhelming maternal 
instinct. It was also interesting to see how Delilah was 
made to be asexual or not involved in any sort of sex- 
ual relationship. Even though she at least had one inti- 
mate encounter [because she has a child], there was 
never any interest in her finding a man or love yet she 
was continually encouraging Mrs. Pullman to fall in 
love. In other words, Delilah's instincts were maternal 
not sexual. 
It was interesting to see how they portrayed Delilah 
as being the faithful servant. This stereotype, made 
up by white America, helps defend the ideology that 
African-Americans are perfectly satisfied in their sub- 
servient position. This is apparent when Mrs. Pullman 
tells Delilah that she could stop working and be fairly 
well off but Delilah cannot bear the thought of not 
taking care of Mrs. Pullman. We are to assume that 
Delilah cannot live independently of a white person. 
This was important because it made the audience more 
comfortable with the relationship between Delilah and 
Mrs. Pullman. This reassured them that Mrs. Pullman 
was not taking advantage of Delilah. 
This woman displays no anxieties in part because 
her position in relation to the material she is writ- 
ing about is not an issue for her. The first woman 
risks putting herself into the text, as students in 
women's studies and African American studies are 
often encouraged to do, and as a result feels like a 
fraud. The second woman blows the cover, as it 
were, on the first's comments, showing that those 
"natural" responses are "ready-made reflections 
which promise a false identity" (Lydon 248). 
Yet however much these journal responses offer 
conflicting ways of reading the place of the "nat- 
ural" in our concepts of the subject, the two women 
hold similar notions of themselves as writing sub- 
jects. The first wants desperately to believe in her 
authenticity and her authority to speak; the second 
simply assumes these. Indeed, although the second 
has mastered better than the first the lesson of read- 
ing and writing as taught in critical pedagogy, it was 
the first who came to change her notion of her self 
as a subject through her writing in the course. For as 
her rhetoric so painfully reveals, she had implicated 
herself in what she had written and, as a result, had 
undermined the authenticity of the I. 
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I am not saying that the first student was the bet- 
ter reader because she put herself into the text. The 
second read with more sophistication at this point 
in the course. But I am saying that the first at least 
came to experience through the act of writing itself 
the kind of self-displacement that so many writers 
on critical pedagogy advocate. In other words, there 
is more than one way of getting it right, or wrong. 
While intellectually and politically astute, the sec- 
ond student's argument makes no demands on her 
subjectivity. While the first reader sought, and failed, 
to suppress her whiteness, which emerged through 
her writing as a category of analysis, the second 
implicitly suggests through her response that she 
can and must disavow her whiteness in analyzing 
whiteness as a racialized identity, thereby reinforc- 
ing the notion that knowing can be separated from 
experience.13 
Changing the Subject 
Now I'm loud.... This is why I usually get along with Af- 
rican Americans. I mean, when we're together, "Whooo!" 
It's like Ifeel totally myself-we just let everything go! 
Camille Paglia (qtd. in hooks, Outlaw Culture) 
Few white women have so repeatedly attracted 
charges of passing as has Fannie Hurst over some 
sixty years of criticism. What made Hurst's repre- 
sentation of black women so controversial, spark- 
ing a lengthy debate in Opportunity magazine in the 
1930s, was that Hurst actively supported black art- 
ists, such as Zora Neale Hurston, her secretary for 
a time. Through her 1933 novel Imitation of Life, 
Hurst brought politically charged issues of passing 
and racism to wide public attention. The 1934 film 
version of the novel was "one of the first screen 
dramas that linked issues of race, gender, and sexu- 
ality" (hooks, Yearning 3-4). Yet the racist repre- 
sentations of Delilah (the mammy) and Peola (the 
tragic mulatta) and the two characters' relationship 
to Bea (the mistress) fostered charges that Hurst was 
a closet racist, that her identity as a liberal was a 
fraud. Hurst did not help to dispel this view when 
she responded to Sterling Brown's attack on the film 
with the patronizing suggestion that blacks should 
be grateful to her because the film "practically inau- 
gurates into the important medium of the motion- 
picture a consideration of the Negro as part of the 
social pattern of American life" (Letter) or when 
she wrote an editorial speculating on the notion "if 
I were a Negro" ("Sure Way").'4 Not surprisingly, 
Brown expressed no more gratitude for the white 
woman's efforts than does bell hooks for Paglia's 
comment cited above: "Naturally, all black Ameri- 
cans were more than pleased to have Miss Camille 
give us this vote of confidence, since we live to 
make it possible for white girls like herself to have 
a place where they can be totally themselves" (Out- 
law Culture 84). 
The controversy surrounding Hurst shares with 
current feminist debates the question of whether 
white women write about black women to make 
black women's experiences and desires known to 
the white public or to become more comfortable 
with their own racial and gender identity at a time 
when many are anxious about the insecurity of 
identity. Partly for this reason, I include Hurst's 
novel and the 1934 film version in my African 
American studies course on the Harlem Renais- 
sance and in my women's studies course on the 
construction of femininity in twentieth-century 
Anglo-American culture. Written at a time of in- 
creasing concern over the numbers of white women 
entering the workforce and of black women leaving 
domestic service, especially as live-in help, the novel 
expresses the kind of ambivalence that attends sys- 
temic social change. Working through the complex 
relations among race, gender, sexuality, and class in 
this novel can be a disorienting experience, as the 
first student's response to the film reveals, but it can 
also provide a way of coming to terms with present- 
day forms of passing. As in Nella Larsen's 1929 
novel Passing, in Imitation of Life passing is the 
site where the often competing narratives of racial 
and gender oppression converge with sexuality. 
On the one hand, the phenomenal business suc- 
cess of Bea Pullman (who passes as "B. Pullman, 
business man" [124]) celebrates the mother's escape 
from domesticity into "a market economy where 
she can supposedly own her own labor" (Wiegman 
309). On the other hand, the novel appeals to nostal- 
gia for the security that the lost mother represents, 
especially in the way Bea domesticates commercial 
space, fashioning her waffle houses as wombs, ken- 
nels, and safe havens (134, 149, 161, 235-36). At 
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the same time that the novel appeals in the charac- 
ter of Delilah to "racial nostalgia" (Berlant 122) for 
the lost mammy, it gives Delilah some of the most 
explicit comments on the operations of race and 
racism in American society. But the novel's great 
interest to me is that it makes clear (as the two film 
versions do not) that at times of increased anxiety 
over women's changing roles and identities, such 
as Hurst's depression era or our postmodern mo- 
ment, the need to return women to the (maternal) 
body becomes all the more urgent. 
What is offbeat about Hurst's novel is that the 
maternal, traditionally assumed to be woman's nat- 
ural role, is exposed as a cover for racism and sexism 
in American society precisely because the maternal 
is linked with the inability to pass. Like the 1934 
film, Hurst's novel ostensibly suggests that racism 
can be overcome if women band together on the 
basis of their shared condition of motherhood. As 
the second student understood, this proposed bond 
sentimentalizes racist social practices. But while 
the film's sentimental ending invites such a read- 
ing, the novel explodes it. 
In the novel, the maternal is revealed to inhibit 
passing when we find out that Peola, who passes as 
white and marries a white man, has had herself ster- 
ilized (a scene not in the films). To pass, she must 
reject the possibility of motherhood (giving birth to 
a dark-skinned child would expose her as a fraud), 
just as she must demand that her dark-skinned 
mother, Delilah, "unborn," or disown, her own 
child. One cannot pass as a mother. This lesson is 
reinforced at the end of the novel (not in the films) 
when Bea, whose business success has been driven 
by a desperate need for domestic security, is de- 
prived of the home she has spent a lifetime dream- 
ing about, planning, building, and furnishing. The 
home is now occupied by her daughter, who has 
married the only man Bea ever loved, her business 
manager eight years her junior, Frank Flake. This 
cruel punishment for the working mother may make 
the novel seem complicit with a patriarchal agenda, 
but the interdependence of the racial and maternal 
discourses suggests a different reading. 
Unlike both screen versions, where Peola returns 
home at the end to throw herself on her mother's 
coffin, the novel resists this nostalgia for the imagi- 
nary maternal. In the novel, Peola passes completely 
in Bolivia with her white husband, and the focus at 
Delilah's Harlem funeral is on Frank's discomfort 
in the presence of so many black people. "Didn't 
know there were so many in the world," he says. 
"There can't be any darkies left anywhere." "Ex- 
cept one," the narrator notes in a parenthetical aside. 
"In her white man's jungle" (329). This reference 
to Peola (one of the few narrative intrusions in the 
novel) reminds us that the plotlines of passing and 
of the maternal are chiasmatically linked. Bea too is 
living in the white man's jungle, the world of busi- 
ness. Peola's disappearance from the novel leaves 
open the possibility that she has successfully dis- 
rupted cultural identities and identifications and has 
thereby elided the effects of race on social relation- 
ships and personal identity, a possibility threatening 
to a racialized society (and hence to Hollywood, 
which must have Peola return home to reclaim her 
racial identity). But the subversiveness of the novel 
actually turns on Peola's sterilization and the link 
between passing and motherhood. For if Bea is 
punished at the end and Peola is not, it is because 
Bea has tried to pass as a mother. Although Peola's 
sterilization may imply that passing is unnatural, 
that a black woman passing as white can never do 
more than impersonate white womanhood, it also 
allows female desire to be detached from maternal 
desire, suggesting that the cultural production of 
femininity can proceed apart from the reproduction 
of mothering and of mammies and thereby under- 
mine the "natural" basis of female identity (Poovey, 
"Abortion" 243), as well as the basis for female 
bonding across racial differences. 
Hurst lets the black woman pass, which could, as 
Sterling Brown charges, reinforce the myth that all 
blacks want to be white. Yet the representations that 
Brown uses to argue that Hurst's novel is racist- 
and it is, in more ways than Brown imagined-also 
locate racism in the cultural production of feminin- 
ity rooted in the maternal. The first student revealed 
the same connection, however unwittingly, when 
not just her whiteness but her femaleness implicated 
her in a racialized identity: "I myself am someone 
who enjoys taking care of others. It has always been 
part of my nature .... Perhaps this was not a color 
issue." Hurst's novel suggests that idealizing the 
maternal is one way white patriarchal culture dis- 
avows the threat posed by passing women and that 
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in the psychoanalytic narrative of subjectivity, the 
racialization of the maternal may be more pervasive 
than the occlusion of women within the symbolic 
register. It is not a feminist project, Hurst suggests, 
to reclaim either the maternal or the black woman's 
body. You have to let it pass. 
Let It Pass 
LOUIS. I'm not racist. Well, maybe I am. 
BELIZE. Oh, Louis, it's no fun picking on you; you're so 
guilty. 
Chicago production of Angels in America 
Writing on the film Imitation of Life, the first stu- 
dent experienced the precariousness of identity 
that characterizes our postmodern moment. In the 
end, taking a position on the subject had less far- 
reaching consequences for her writing than did 
changing her own subject position, for her doubts 
and hesitations meant that she could no longer take 
for granted her self as referent. She learned through 
her writing that the subject position from which 
one speaks and writes is never secure. Having no 
secure position to which to return is precisely what 
distinguishes passing without the as from passing 
as. Coming to terms with the precariousness of 
one's own identity opens up the possibility of pass- 
ing, or, in Toni Morrison's words, of "becoming," 
the "process of entering what one is estranged from" 
(4)-which may not be those labeled other but the 
self that one has long thought one's own. Through 
her halting efforts to come to terms with gender 
identity as racially inflected, the first student came 
to work through (in both senses of that phrase) her 
own identifications in a way that the second woman, 
however savvy her response, was never able to do 
in her writing. The second woman found a secure 
position from which to write; the first wrote through 
some precarious positions, a performative process 
that provided an experience of subjectivity as pass- 
ing that the second woman's discourse rhetorically 
suppressed. 
The point of all this for the teaching of literature 
is that we need to provide our students with strate- 
gies and occasions for working through rather than 
taking up-taking a stand on-subject positions. 
Such opportunities are especially important when- 
ever we make whiteness visible as a racial category, 
available for critique and open to delegitimation; 
whenever we reconceive concepts of essence and 
experience in the aftermath of poststructuralist the- 
ories; and whenever we engage the politics of iden- 
tity in postmodernity and in cultural criticism.15 The 
double bind created by the discrepancy between 
what we profess and how we are positioned, be- 
tween the demands of a critical pedagogy and the 
constraints of postmodern culture, cannot be re- 
solved only in theory but must also be confronted 
performatively in the literature classroom. My read- 
ings of the critical essays, the student responses, 
and the novel are intended to alert us to those mo- 
ments when passing is happening in our classrooms 
and our writing so that we can exploit the analyti- 
cal, political, and ethical possibilities it creates. 
It is not that I would reject self-critique by whites 
writing on race or men writing on feminism. On 
the contrary. But I would argue that self-critique 
can be effective only when we do not attempt to re- 
claim the body, to revive the humanist subject, or 
to find appropriate figures for postmodern subjec- 
tivity. Self-critique without a postmodernist effort 
to free concepts of identity from their metaphysical 
foundations leaves only a choice between the con- 
fessional and the fraudulent. The problem is not 
self-critique: it is rather, as Mary Poovey writes in 
another context ("Feminism," esp. 38), that the hu- 
manist subject continues to be produced as a solu- 
tion to the cultural problematic that places us all 
in the position of passing. The more passing be- 
comes the possibility opened up by our interrogation 
of subject positions, the more, it seems, we defend 
ourselves against it by making it unnatural or illegi- 
timate. Such a cultural problematic, however, can- 
not be elided by any I seeking a more authentic 
position. We cannot get out of passing by attempt- 
ing to reclaim the subject, the body, or the real 
thing. We have to let it pass. 
Notes 
I wish to thank the following friends and colleagues for their 
helpful comments on this essay: Anne Callahan, Susan Cavallo, 
36 
This content downloaded from 147.126.10.123 on Mon, 02 Nov 2015 17:50:03 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Pamela L. Caughie 
Judy Massey Dozier, Susan Jarratt, Eleanor Honig Skoller, Isa- 
iah Smithson, and Lynn Worsham. Thanks also go to Michele 
Troy for her editorial assistance and to Danielle Glassmeyer for 
her research on Hurst. 
I borrow the term culture studies from Isaiah Smithson, who 
attributes it to Gayatri Spivak. As opposed to cultural studies, 
culture studies designates less a distinct methodology and criti- 
cal tradition than the state of the humanities in the aftermath of 
the theoretical and social upheavals of the past two decades. See 
Smithson for a brief but detailed definition of culture studies. I 
use cultural critics to refer not just to practitioners of cultural 
studies and to critics of popular culture but also to scholars and 
teachers whose object of study is the effect, not the origin, of 
representations and discourses and who see their task as one of 
"interrogating cultural phenomena rather than elucidating liter- 
ary masterpieces" (Smithson 1). 
Originally I intended the subtitle of my essay to allude to a 
1985 paper by Nancy K. Miller, "Changing the Subject: Author- 
ship, Writing, and the Reader" (ch. 5 in her Subject to Change), 
which argues that a poststructuralist concept of the subject does 
not work for women. But I have since found this phrase in other 
relevant works. Changing the Subject is a 1984 collection of es- 
says that integrates psychoanalytic theories of subjectivity with 
a Foucauldian concern for the social discourses and technologies 
that regulate subjectivity (Henriques et al.). In "On the Subjects 
of Class and Gender in 'The Literacy Letters,'" Linda Brodkey 
uses the phrase as the subtitle of a section on postmodern theo- 
ries of subjectivity. Gayle Greene and Coppelia Kahn gave the 
title Changing Subjects: The Making of Feminist Literary Criti- 
cisml to a 1993 collection they edited, which historicizes and 
theorizes the personal to reclaim for feminists the legitimacy of 
saying "I" and "we." "Changing the subject" seems to be a de- 
fining trope for feminism in the wake of poststructuralism. 
-In my text, I use the first-person plural pronoun ethically, to 
implicate my readers in a cultural problematic that requires a 
shared structure of response. I differentiate between the we of 
performative engagement and the we of disembodied truth. In 
a performative practice, we refers not to discrete identities that 
exist before engagement with others but to identities brought into 
being through engagement. While feminist and African Ameri- 
can critics have rightly questioned the imperial we in writing 
that takes white male experience as the norm, now critics by no 
means marginalized can mobilize that resistance to the use of 
we in their own interests, to escape their implication in the struc- 
tural dynamics that I call passing. But the issue is more compli- 
cated even than that. It would be too easy to distinguish absolutely 
between the imperial we and the performative wve; such a distinc- 
tion ignores the inevitable slippage between the two, which is 
the subject of this article. 
3On the issue of who can speak in the classroom, see, e.g., 
Fuss, Speaking, esp. the last chapter, "Essentialism in the Class- 
room"; hooks, Teaching, esp. the critique of Fuss in ch. 6, and 
Yearninlg. 
4"Postmodern culture" is a shorthand to refer to a number of 
social, cultural, economic, and technological changes over the 
past three decades that have converged to alter profoundly our 
experience of and our thinking about identity in Western culture. 
These changes are registered, in Poovey's words, "as challenges 
to the most basic units of humanist understanding-the indi- 
viduality of the subject and the bodily integrity of the person" 
("Feminism" 39). 
50n the characterization of passing as betrayal in classic pass- 
ing texts, see V. Smith. 
6Trying to mediate between humanism's autonomous subject 
and poststructuralism's depersonalized subject, Alcoff's concept 
of positionality defines the subject by social location and histor- 
ical experiences rather than by essential attributes. Positionality 
conceives the subject's position as "a place from where meaning 
is constructed, rather than simply the place where a meaning can 
be discovered (the meaning of femaleness)" ("Feminism" 434). 
7My critique of arguments like Alcoff's that are based on a 
notion of positionality is meant not to deny that subjects are po- 
sitioned but to undercut the idea that one acts from a fixed or 
prior position. The kind of self-critique Alcoff advocates, where 
one identifies oneself by race, gender, sexuality, class, age, and 
so on, before speaking, assumes that the subject is positioned 
before speaking. In a performative view, the subject is brought 
into being through the engagement with others. Judith Butler in 
"For a Careful Reading" and Phillip Brian Harper in "'The Sub- 
versive Edge"' correct common misreadings of performativity 
that assume a subject acts voluntarily, taking on a certain subjec- 
tivity as if playing a role. This voluntaristic I is not the subject 
that informs my conception of passing. 
8As Susan David Bernstein says, "Any rhetorical posture, 
whether in an article or in the classroom, is already mediated, 
compromised by desires, by forces of language and culture, that 
cannot be grasped together by any one 'I.'" The subject is not 
reduced to its linguistic performance, she adds, but "the dimen- 
sions of language structure the representation of any episte- 
mological claims about an 'I"' (127, 142). Alcoff tries both to 
acknowledge and, in the interests of a coalition politics, to obvi- 
ate the truth of this deconstruction of the I. In contrast, my pass- 
ing is an effort to work through the radical implications of 
Derrida's practice, as do Judith Butler (Bodies and "Reading") 
and Drucilla Cornell (Accommodation and Philosophy). Whereas 
coalition politics makes the erroneous assumption that to surren- 
der categories of identity is to surrender politics, Butler seeks to 
articulate a politics that is not tied to identity categories. In the 
dynamics of passing, one cannot worry about being exposed as 
either the real thing or a fraud, for passing contaminates the dis- 
tinction between the two. Passing delimits positionality but in 
doing so no more abandons the notion of position than Derrida's 
"iterability"-the principle that any sign is necessarily a repeti- 
tion or citation, which limits intentionality's role in the determi- 
nation of meaning-abandons the category of intentionality. 
9The psychological no less than the political is historical 
(Willis 320). Susan Standford Friedman uses the term "psycho/ 
political dynamics" in an essay that attempts to negotiate be- 
tween poststructuralist and nonpoststructuralist feminisms, es- 
pecially between their conflicting notions of the subject (474). 
1?I argue in the introduction to my book Passing and Peda- 
gogy that many performance artists get it right-that is, they un- 
derstand the performativity of subjectivity that academics may 
concede in theory but often forget in practice. 
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1 The term critical pedagogy, referring to activist teaching in 
general, designates a practice that necessarily concerns itself 
with questions of subjectivity and agency in postmodern cul- 
ture. See, for example, Aronowitz and Giroux 117-18; Giroux; 
George and Shoos 201-02; Jarratt 107-17. My reading of Ho- 
mans and Abel, like their readings of feminists, seeks to un- 
derstand the complex and contradictory positions writers and 
teachers inhabit in cultural criticism and in postmodern culture. 
I write on these essays not to refute them but to discover by 
working through them what I can say and do, what positions I 
can and cannot assume as a feminist critic and teacher. 
'2Poovey analyzes various defenses against the pervasive fear 
that the nature of the human is at risk in postmodern culture 
("Feminism" 35-36). I borrow from her description to account 
for how postmodernist feminist theory prompts defensive re- 
sponses in some feminists afraid that it eliminates the body. On 
the notion of identity at risk in postmodern culture, see Poovey, 
"Feminism"; Butler, Bodies and "Imitation"; and Wicke. 
3On this notion, see Harding. 
14Hurst passed in other ways. To experience lives she wrote 
about, she would engage in impersonation. Once she took a job 
as a shopgirl in her father's factory so that she could portray 
such a lifestyle in a novel. To create a place for her, Hurst's fa- 
ther fired the real thing. This example should be enough to warn 
us against the dangers of overgeneralizing about the ethics of 
passing. "There is passing and then there is passing" (Butler, 
Bodies 130). 
15On the problems that can arise in the classroom whenever 
we interrogate whiteness and other racialized identities, see 
Keating, especially her observation that students often conflate 
representations of whiteness with white people. 
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